Abstract
Introduction
In market competition, the private information is the knowledge that can't be shared by all participants, such as a participant's cost, utility, bankroll, stocks, the estimate for other participants' utility, and the estimate for assessment of other participants' utility etc [1] . It is significant to infer the rival's private information accurately, because it can help a participant to know rival's motivation, make decision rapidly and accurately, have the initiative, avoid venture, and obtain sustaining gain.
Influence diagrams [2] are a popular framework for decision analysis under uncertainty. An influence diagram is essentially a Bayesian network augmented with decision variables, utility functions, and precedence constraints. An influence diagram intuitively represents the causalities among decision events, the bias-ordering relations and state of information on decision behaviors. Evaluating an influence diagram means determining an optimal decision maximizing the expected utility for the decision maker. However, in real life, a decision maker may observe rival's decision behaviors, but the decision maker does not know rival's private information. To infer rival's private information, the decision maker can carry out reverse inference, i.e. finding parameters maximizing global expected utility under observation about rival's decision behaviors, in an influence diagram for modeling rival's decision making processes.
In this paper, we model rival's decision making processes by applying influence diagrams, divide rival's private information into private chance information, private decision information, and private utility information, and derive the procedures for inferring rival's private information based on the criterion that a rational decision maker always pursues maximal global expect utility. Preliminary experiments show that our method is feasible.
The other part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work. Section 3 reviews the concept of influence diagrams. Section 4 defines type of rival's private information. Section 5 derives the procedures for inferring rival's private information. Section 6 shows the experimental results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related work
The problem that how to reveal rival's private information has been studied by many economists. Maresa & Harstad [3] discussed the probability that vendee reveal the information to one or more tenderers in private. This information can help to assess bargainer's asset but it was possessed by vendee in auction. Gottardi [4] studied how the bargainers who knew information and bargainers who didn't know information made decisions dynamically and reveal private information under asymmetric information in securities business. In these studies, the connotation of private information is extensive and the researchers mainly took economic point of view to analyze conditions, opportunity, payoffs of employing the private information and factors which effect on revealing private information.
Influence diagrams have been extensively applied in decision analysis and uncertain inference. Meyer & Phillips [5] incorporated the decision theoretic concept of an influence diagram into the solution of the multiobjective optimization inverse planning problem. Demirer & Charnes [6] proposed the use of influence diagrams as effective tools to model and place values on investment opportunities consisting of options on real assets. Koller & Milch [7] proposed multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving noncooperative games. Tamine & Boughanem [8] proposed an influence diagram based retrieval model which was able to incorporate contexts, viewed as user's long-term interests into the retrieval process. Suryadi & Gmytrasiewicz [9] used influence diagrams as a modeling representation of agents, which was used to interact with them and to predict their behavior.
There is a rich collection of methods for evaluating influence diagrams. Howard & Matheson [2] unfolded an influence diagram into a decision tree and solved it using dynamic programming, Shachter [10] used techniques such as arc-reversal and decision-removal, Cooper [11] and Zhang [12] reduced influence diagrams into Bayesian networks and applied Bayesian inference to solve optimal decision policies, Shenoy [13] transformed an influence diagram into a valuation network and applied variable elimination to solve the valuation network, and Bhattacharjya & Shachter [14] compiled influence diagrams into decision circuits and used the decision circuits to compute the optimal policies.
Influence diagrams
An influence diagram is a directed acyclic graph I=<N,A> which consists of node set N and arc set A. The node set N can be classified three types: chance node, decision node, and utility node. A chance node is depicted as an ellipse. It describes an event which is likely to come forth and it can't be affected by people's behavior. Each event may have finite different states. A chance node s has a corresponding probability distribution table to describe its condition probability distribution p(s/Pa(s)) under the parent node set Pa(s), where Pa(s) are nodes with arcs directed to s. A decision node is depicted as a rectangle. It expresses behaviors the decision system may take. Every decision deserves a reward, so each decision node corresponds to a utility node. A utility node is depicted as a diamond. It denotes preferences of a decision maker. Every utility node u associates with a utility function fu(Pa(u)), which is a real function denoting the utility values of u in the context of its parents Pa(u). Except for utility node, both chance node and decision node can give arc. Arcs represent influences between nodes. Let S=(s1，s2，…，sm) be the set of chance nodes, D=(d1，d2，…，dn) be the set of decision nodes, and U=(u1，u2，…，ub) be set of utility nodes. Every chance node has its own state space. The j-th state of the i-th chance node si is denoted by si(j). Every decision node also has its own behaviors offered to decision-maker. The j-th behavior of the i-th decision node di is denoted by di(j) . The utility function of the i-th utility node ui in the context of its parents Pa(ui) is denoted as ui(Pa(ui)). Figure 1 is an example of an influence diagram.
Each decision behavior can obtain some utility at a decision node. However, the utility can vary even if decision remains same under different states of chance nodes. Let Pa(ui) be those nodes with arcs directed to utility node ui, decision node di Pa(ui), and di selects the ii-th behavior, then the expected utility ) (
Where s0，s1，…，si-1 are the chance nodes before decision node di. s0 is the chance node observed before all decisions are made. si is the chance node which is observed after decision node di makes a decision but before decision node di+1 makes a decision.
are behaviors taken at decision nodes prior to node di. 
Let d1，d2，，dm be a decision node sequence from d1 to dm and a configuration of behaviors at 1 d ，d2，，dm is called a decision-behavior-path. Let the configuration
be path j. The accumulative utility EU(path j) corresponding to path j is defined as follows:
Every participant in competition aims at maximizing global expected utility in whole multi-steps decision rather than gain the local maximum expected utility just in each step. In fact, the maximum global expected utility couldn't be obtained even if local expected utility in each step is maximal. In influence diagrams, an optimal decision combination is a decision-behavior-path whose accumulative expected utility is the largest. That path is denoted by path j*, and 
The type of rival's private information
Assume a competitor has designed rival's influence diagram. In terms of influence diagram model, the rival's private information can be divided into private chance information, private decision information and private utility information.
Private chance information
The competitor just knows the state space of chance node sk, but the competitor doesn't clearly know which state sk is. For example, in Figure 1 , the competitor doesn't know what value p(s1(1)) is. We will call chance node sk as private chance node, and call the parameters attached to sk as private chance information.
Private Decision information
There is more than one decision node in an influence diagram, but the competitor usually may not observe rival's each decision action. For example, the competitor can't know which action the rival should take at decision node dk. We will call decision node dk as private decision node, and call the rival's decision at dk as private decision information.
Private Utility information
The competitor just knows the distribution of utility for utility node uk, but the competitor has no idea about each precise utility value. In Figure 1 , for example, the competitor is sure of u1(d1(2)s1(1))>0, but the competitor doesn't know the precise value of u1(d1 (2)s1(1)). We will call utility node uk as private utility node and call the value attached to uk as private utility information.
There are close relationship between rival's decision behaviors and rival's private information. Different private information decides different decision-behavior-path. Further more, each participant can observe other participant's decision behaviors, since all participants in the competition face the same market. Therefore, rival's private information can be revealed by inferring when rival's some decision behaviors have been observed. The rival's decision-behavior-path path k implies that decisions in path k should be most beneficial to rival if the rival is a rational decision-maker. Namely, if path k is optimal decision behaviors path, path k satisfy to:
Consequently, if rival's private information is  and observed decision-behavior-path is path k, the accumulative utility
is a function with respect to . That is to say,
Inferring rival's private information
As discussed previously, Applying influence diagrams to infer rival's private information is to ask for parameters which can maximize accumulative utility of rival's decision-behavior-path. That is a complex combination-optimized issue since there may be more than one private chance node, private decision node, or private utility node simultaneously. For this issue, Genetic algorithm (GA) [15] should be a suitable method.
GAs are algorithms for optimization based on features of biological evaluation, they are capable of exploring a large and complex space in an intelligent way to find solutions close to the global optimization. A GA constructs an iteration procedure where problem space is replaced by encoding space. The fitness function is an assessment of optimization. The encoding population is the basis of evolution. The genetic operation of encoding individual in population simulates the process of evolution. In the evolution, the encoding successors in population are going to be superior to their predecessors by the means of gene recombination such that the encoding individual will gradually approach the optimal result. Let rival's private node set be =(s,d,u), sS, dD, uU. s stands for the set of private chance node, s =(s.s1,s.s2,…,s.sr), where s.sr stands for the r-th private chance node in s. d is set of private decision node, d=(d.d1,d.d2,…,d.dt), where d.dt stands for the t-th private decision node in d. u is set of private utility node, u=(u.u1,u.u2,…,u.uv), where u.uv stands for the v-th private utility node in u. If competitor just doesn't know rival's chance information, =(s), d=， u=. Others are analogical.
Genetic individual
Rival's private information includes chance, decision, and utility information, so a genetic individual should cover chance, decision, and utility gene in order to infer the rival's private information. The w-th individual w  is defined as follows:  is a real number which indicates that the competitor guesses i-th private utility node ui having zi-th value. 
Fitness function

Selection operator
If there are size individuals in population, every individual is a combinat ion of rival's private information, and individual w  has selection probability  .
Crossover and mutation operator
Crossover of chance gene
Let the probability of crossover be cs 
Crossover of decision gene
The crossover of decision gene will take place at single point. The crossover position i is selected randomly from t bits of wd 
Crossover of utility gene
The crossover of utility gene also takes place at single point. 
Stop condition of the algorithm
The algorithm doesn't stop until the difference of highest fitness in several continuous generations is below a threshold or the maximum number of generation is reached. The first condition shows that the population has been mature and no longer advanced to evolution.
Experiment
Let Q1 and Q2 be two competitive enterprises. Q2 designs the influence diagram of Q1 according to domain knowledge. The structure of the influence diagram is depicted in Figure 1 . Chance node s1 denotes the production cost of Q1. State s1(1) and s1(2) stand for higher cost and lower cost respectively. Node s2 depicts the output. State s2(1) and s2(2) stand for higher output and lower output respectively. Node s3 denotes the condition of capital. State s3(1) stands for abundant capital. State s3(2) stands for deficient capital. The decision node d1 describes whether Q1 will expand production capacity. d1(1) means enlargement, while d1(2) means not. d2 expresses the marketing strategy of Q1. d2(1) means to lessen the price, while d2(2) means the opposite meaning. Utility node u1 and u2 describe the payoffs of decision node d1 and d2 respectively. Besides, Q2 knows some parameters of the influence diagram (the parameters Q2 knows is consistent with that showing in Figure 1 ). But there are some parameters only Q1 knows. These parameters are private information of Q1. Q2 needs to infer them.
Inferring private chance information
Inferring p(s 1 (1) )
Assume that Q2 has no idea of production cost of Q1, namely in Figure 1 , p(s1 (1)) is unknown. Let d1(1)d2(2) be decision-behavior-path observed by Q2. It shows that Q1 expands the production capacity and doesn't lower the price in sale. The genetic individual comprises a single chance gene, described by (p(s1(1)))，p(s1(1))[0,1]. The crossover probability is 0.9. The mutation probability is 0.5. The population size is 10. GA performs 100 rounds. 500 iterations are done per round.
In all experiments, EU(d1 (1)d2 (2)) is the largest one among four payoffs and p(s1(1)) <0.1. s1(1) stands for higher production cost in Figure 1 , hence less p(s1(1)) stands for less cost of Q1. It is reasonable to expand the production capacity and don't lower the price in sale when production cost is low and capital is abundant.
When observed decision-behavior-path varies, the largest EU(d1(i)d2(j)) and p(s1 (1)) also vary. For example, EU(d1 (2)d2(2)) is the largest in four payoffs and p(s1(1)) >0.9 when path d1(2)d2 (2) is discovered (Q1 doesn't expand the production capacity and doesn't lower price in sale). It is advisable to don't expand the production capacity and don't lower price in sale when production cost is high and capital is abundant.
Inferring p(s 1 (1) ) and p(s 3 (1) )
Assume that Q2 doesn't know production cost and capital status of Q1, namely in Figure 1 , both p(s1 (1)) and p(s3 (1)) are unknown. Let d1(1)d2(1) be observed decision-behavior-path. It indicates that Q1 expands the production capacity and lower the price in sale. A genetic individual comprises two chance genes, described by (p(s1 (1)),p(s3 (1))). The genetic operation parameters are same as 6.1.1. Experimental results show that EU(d1 (1)d2(1)) is the largest one among four payoffs and p(s1(1))<0.02, p(s3(1))< 0.03. The two probabilities are both small. That means that Q1's production cost is low and capital is deficient. It is advisable to expand the production capacity and lower the price in sale when production cost is low and capital is deficient.
If decision-behavior-path d1 (1)d2 (2) is discovered, EU(d1 (1)d2 (2)) is the largest one among four payoffs and p(s1(1))<0.02, p(s3(1))>0.97. It is reasonable to expand the production capacity and don't lower price in sale when production cost is low and capital is abundant.
Inferring private decision behavior
Suppose Q2 has observed Q1's action d1(2) at d1. However, Q2 doesn't know what action Q1 will take at d2. Q2 can compute EU(d1(2)d2(1))=104.08 and EU(d1(2)d2(2))=113.92 according to the parameters in Figure 1 . Since Q1 has only two-steps decision, Q2 can infer that Q1 should take action d2(2) at d2 if Q1 is a rational decision-maker. In Figure 1 , p(s1(1))=0.8, p(s3(1))=0.8 indicates that Q1 has higher production cost and abundant capital, so it is advisable to take decision-behavior-path d1(2)d2(2).
Q2 may know nothing about production cost p(s1(1)) of Q1 and have no idea about Q1's action at d2 either. Q2 just observes that Q1 takes the action d1(2) at d1.
A genetic individual comprises a chance gene and a decision gene. A individual is described by (p(s1 (1)),d2）,where p(s1(1))[0,1], d2{1,2}. The genetic operation parameters are same as 6.1.1. Experimental results always have p(s1(1))>0.99 and d2=2 in all experiments. p(s1(1))>0.99 shows that the production cost of Q1 is high. Thus, Q1 shouldn't expand production capacity. It matches Q1's action d1(2) at d1. In Figure 1 , p(s3(1))=0.8 implies that the capital of Q1 is abundant. Because the production capacity is not expanded and output is low, Q1 should adopt action d1(2) at d2 (doesn't lower the price in sale) when capital is abundant.
Inferring private utility information
If Q2 knows little about some utility of Q1, such as u1(d1(1)s1(2)) and u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2)) in Figure 1 , total accumulative utility of whole decision-behavior-path is a function of u1(d1(1)s1(2)) and u2(d2(2)s2 (1)s3(2)). u1(d1(1)s1(2)) denotes payoffs from expanding capacity when production cost is low. u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2)) denotes payoffs from lowering price when output is high and capital is deficient. Thus, u1(d1(1)s1(2))<0, u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2))>0, meanwhile u1(d1(1)s1(2)) and u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2)) should satisfy all conditions listed in Table 1 . 
The genetic individual comprises two utility genes. A individual is described by (u1(d1(1)s1(2))), u2(d2(2)s2 (1)s3(2))). The genetic operation parameters are same as 6.1.1. Parts of result are shown in Table 2 . In the mark row of table 2, "1" implies that the utility combinations of u1(d1(1)s1 (2)) and u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2))) in the same column satisfy to the conditions in Table 1 , "-1" implies disagreement. In table 2, the cases, u1(d1(1)s1(2))>0, extremely small u1(d1(1)s1 (2)) (-47), extremely large u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2))) (190), and u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2)))<0, are not satisfy to the conditions in Table 1 . u1(d1(1)s1(2))>0 is not reasonable because expanding capacity needs to append investment. u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2)))<0 is not logical because enterprise should gain in sale. Extremely small u1(d1(1)s1(2)) means extremely investment, so Q1 will face high risk. Extremely large u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2))) means enormous benefit, which is too special. Therefore, the parameters under above cases are not expected parameters. -47< u1(d1(1)s1(2))<0, 0< u2(d2(2)s2(1)s3(2)))<190 denotes that Q1 will gain by investment at an appropriate risk.
All above experiments adopt same genetic operation parameters. The crossover probability is 0.9, the mutation probability is 0.5, and the population size is 10. GA performs 100 rounds. 500 iterations are done per round. The actual experimental results show that mutation probability and population size have a little effect on astringency of algorithm. The algorithm will reach convergence as long as the mutation probability is more than 0.3.
Conclusions
In this paper, the rival's decision-making model is described by an influence diagram, and rival's private information about cost, bankroll, tactic, and utility is inferred. The experimental results show that our proposed method is feasible. But our research just considered one rival's decision. In fact, there is some game relationship among players in competition, so the rival's utilities on some decision nodes not only rely on their own status but also rely on other plays' behaviors. The future work will infer rival's private information in game environments.
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